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8 9 10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
11	WESTERN DIVISION				
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	Opposition to Receiver's Motion for Order Approving Distribution of Assets To Investors In Copeland Properties 18, L.P. and For Related Relief				

Thomas C. Hebrank, the Receiver, ("Mr. Hebrank") moves for an order approving his distribution of Copeland Properties 18, L.P.'s ("CP18") assets to its investors and approving the termination and cancellation of CP18 as an entity ("the Motion"). As described more fully below, Mr. Hebrank's Motion is procedurally flawed and without substantive merit.

#### I

#### THE FACTS

#### A. Mr. Hebrank's Motion

In the Motion, Mr. Hebrank asks this Court to authorize him to distribute CP18's cash resulting from its sale of a parcel of real property located at 6103 Landmark Center Blvd., Greensboro, NC 27407 ("the North Carolina Property") without making provision for any payment to Copeland Properties 3, L.P. ("CP3"), which lent money to CP18. [Doc. Nos. 319-1, pg. 10, lns. 12-22 and 319-2; Exh. "A" thereto].

In his plan of distribution, Mr. Hebrank proposes to first pay off the following debts of CP18: (1) loans made to CP18 by various Copeland entities (i.e., Copeland Properties 5, L.P., Copeland Properties 17, L.P., and Copeland Realty, Inc.); (2) a loan made by Werdna Eure to CP 18; (3) management fees owed by CP 18 to an unidentified entity, presumably either Copeland Realty, Inc. or Copeland Wealth Management, a Real Estate Corporation; and (4) accrued attorneys fees. [Doc. No. 319-2; pg. 5, Ins. 14-20, Exh. "A" thereto].

Thereafter, Mr. Hebrank proposes to pay CP18's 2012 taxes and the costs associated with preparing its tax returns. [*Id.*].

Finally, Mr. Hebrank proposes to distribute the remaining \$2,257,425.38 to holders of equity interest in CP 18. [*Id.*].

Mr. Hebrank's planned distributions do not include any payments to CP3 or to Neal Bricker, M.D., a limited partner in CP3 ("Dr. Bricker"). [*Id*.].

# B. Dr. Bricker's Proof of Claim and Mr. Hebrank's Erroneous Denial Thereof

In light of the fact that Mr. Hebrank, who is the Receiver appointed by this Court to act on behalf of CP3, did not appear to be planning to arrange to pursue its claims against CP18 for amounts loaned by CP3 to CP18, and in light of the fact that Dr. Bricker was not authorized to act on behalf of CP3 to protect its interests, Dr. Bricker submitted a Proof of Claim in his individual capacity against CP18 seeking to at least recover, at least, the \$215,000 that he had originally invested into CP3. [Doc. No. 319-2, pg. 6, lns. 8–21].

As Mr. Hebrank acknowledges, Dr. Bricker's claim against CP18 is based on CP18's indebtedness to CP3 for amounts borrowed from CP3 to purchase the North Carolina Property. [Doc. Nos. 319-2, pg. 6, lns. 15–21; 319-1, pg. 7, lns. 16-23].

Mr. Hebrank unilaterally, and without this Court's approval, denied Dr. Bricker's claim on the ground that "CP3 did not loan money to CP18, nor did CP3 purchase the Property." [*Id.*]. Mr. Hebrank claims that the monies provided by CP3 to CP18, which totaled \$2,128,544.11, was actually an investment by CP3 into CP18, not a loan by CP3 to CP18. [*Id.*].

Mr. Hebrank's claims in his Motion directly contradict his prior submissions to this Court wherein he represented that CP3 had loaned \$2,128,544.11 to CP18 and further represented that CP18 had a note payable to CP3 in that amount. [Doc. No., 47-2, pg. 32 through 33, Section 2003 of CP18's General Ledger entitled "Note Payable – CP – CP3" reflecting that CP3 loaned a total of \$2,128,544.11 to CP18].

On August 16, 2013, in the face of a Motion by, among others, Dr. Bricker asking this Court to lift the stay to allow CP3's creditors and CP3's limited partners to file suit against, among others, CP18, to recoup the amounts loaned by

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CP3 to CP18, Mr. Hebrank filed this Motion without first making any attempt to "meet and confer" with counsel for Dr. Bricker. [Brubacher Decl.,  $\P$  2].

II

### MR. HEBRANK'S MOTION IS PROCEDURALLY FLAWED

California Central District Local Rule 7-3 provides as follows: "[C]ounsel contemplating the filing of any motion shall first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, *preferably in person*, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution. . . . If the parties are unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the necessity for a hearing, counsel for the moving party shall include in the notice of motion a statement to the following effect:

'This motion is made following the conference of counsel pursuant to L.R. 7-3 which took place on (date).'" (Emphasis in original).

Mr. Hebrank's Notice of the Motion fails to comply with Local Rule 7-3 because it reflects that Mr. Hebrank's counsel filed the motion after an unspecified "attempt to confer with counsel pursuant to" Local Rule 7-3 as opposed to an actual conference of counsel.

The reason for Mr. Hebrank's attempt to circumvent Local Rule 7-3 is simple -- Mr. Hebrank's counsel did not comply with Local Rule 7-3's requirements or even attempt to do so. [Brubacher Decl., ¶ 2].

For this reason alone, the Court should deny Mr. Hebrank's Motion. Superbalife, Int'l v. Powerpay 2008 WL 4559752 at \*1 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (denial of motion to dismiss for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3).

#### Ш

# MR. HEBRANK HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS PLANNED DISTRIBUTION IS FAIR OR REASONABLE

As Mr. Hebrank points out in his Motion, this Court may only authorize his plan of distribution if he shows that it is both fair and reasonable. The burden is on

Mr. Hebrank to produce competent evidence that would support a finding that his planned distribution is both fair and reasonable. *SEC v. Wealth Management, LLC*, 628 F.3d 323, 332-333 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010) (plan proposed by equitable receiver must be both fair and reasonable); *SEC v. Wang*, 944 F.2d 80, 88 (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 1991) (same). Mr. Hebrank has failed to do so.

The only evidence Mr. Hebrank has provided in support of his claim that his plan of distribution is fair and reasonable with respect with respect to Dr. Bricker's Claim and the monies provided by CP3 to CP18 is his self-serving declaration wherein he opines that he is "informed and believes that CP3 did not loan money to CP18" and that he is "informed and believes" that the amounts provided by CP3 to purchase the North Carolina Property were an investment by CP3 in CP18 not a loan by CP3 to CP18. [Doc. No. 319-2, pgs. 6-7, ¶21]. Mr. Hebrank has failed to produce any of the information he relied on in arriving at his beliefs.

The reason for his failure to do so is obvious – there is no such information or evidence. As described above, Mr. Hebrank's prior submissions to this very Court clearly reflect that CP3 did, in fact, Ioan \$2,128,544.11 to CP18, notwithstanding Mr. Hebrank's recent claims to the contrary. [Doc. No., 47-2, pg. 32 through 33, Section 2003 of CP18's General Ledger entitled "Note Payable – CP – CP3" reflecting that CP3 loaned a total of \$2,128,544.11 to CP18].

Mr. Hebrank must not be allowed to re-classify the monies provided by CP3 to CP18 in an effort to justify his discriminatory treatment of CP3. *Rockwell International v. Hanford Atomic Metal Trades*, 851 F.2d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 1988) (doctrine of judicial estoppel "is intended to protect against a litigant playing 'fast and loose with the courts' by asserting inconsistent positions'); *Broderick v. Anderson*, 23 F.Supp. 488, 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ("Plaintiff cannot blow hot and blow cold as to its position under the facts here."); *Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Superior Court*, 36 Cal.App.4th 275, 278, fn. 3 (1995) ("This court has noticed an increasing, and disturbing, tendency of counsel to alter argumentative

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course 180° to suit the prevailing wind of expediency. 'One may not alter one's [legal] argument as the chameleon does his color, to suit whatever terrain one inhabits at the moment.'").

In the event that Mr. Hebrank may attempt to again change course in his reply papers and belatedly argue that CP18 repaid the \$2,128,544.11 that CP3 loaned to it, the Court should disregard that argument as well as any evidence belatedly submitted in support thereof. *Zamani v. Carnes*, 491 F3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) ("district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief"). To do otherwise, would be patently unfair to and a violation of Dr. Bricker's due process rights. *Wild Fish Conservancy v. National Park Service*, 2012 WL 6615925 (W.D. Wash. 2012) ("Plaintiffs . . . presented a new argument in their reply . . ., which is procedurally improper and violates due process."); *Beaird v. Seagate Tech., Inc.*, 145 F3d 1159, 1164–1165 (10th Cir. 1998) (if the court relies on new material contained in a reply brief, it must afford the opposing party a reasonable opportunity to respond).

Allowing Mr. Hebrank to make new arguments and to present new evidence would create a host of issues. For example, assuming that Mr. Hebrank argued that CP18 repaid \$1,705,000 of the monies lent to it by CP3 by issuing equity interests in CP18 to certain of CP3's limited partners, Mr. Hebrank has not offered any evidence to support such an argument. Among other things, Mr. Hebrank has not offered any Form K-1s that reflect the initial equity interest of any of CP3's limited partners in CP18 or any evidence to show that those Form K-1s totaled \$1,705,000.

Even if Mr. Hebrank could belatedly produce evidence showing that CP3 or any of CP3's limited partners received equity interests in CP18 totaling \$1,705,000, he has offered no evidence to explain why CP18 should not be required to repay to CP3 the remaining amount of the note receivable, \$423,544.11 (i.e., \$2,128,544.11 minus \$1,705,000).

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Mr. Hebrank may belatedly argue that CP18 is not required to repay the remaining amount of the note receivable, \$423,544.11 because CP3 transferred its rights thereto to Copeland Realty, Inc. ("CRI"), CP3's General Partner. However, Mr. Hebrank has offered no evidence to substantiate any such transfer or to show that any such transfer, which Mr. Hebrank described as ambiguous and complex, was legitimately made. [Doc. No. 90, pg. 5 of 16, ln. 11 through pg. 6 of 16, ln. 12]. The absence of any evidence relating to the \$423,544.11 is, standing alone, fatal to this Motion because this Court cannot reasonably be expected to "rubber stamp" such a transfer to CRI, an entity that the Receiver accused of using CP3 as its "Piggy Bank" and of having perpetrated a fraud upon victims such as Dr. Bricker. [Doc. No. 90, pg. 3 of 16, lns. 25-28 ("The General Partner . . . Copeland Realty, Inc. [] treated the Receivership Entities as a collective 'Piggy Bank' with funds flowing freely between entities on an as needed basis."); Doc. No. 130, pg. 5 of 29, lns. 3-5 ("This case involves a fraud perpetrated largely upon retired, or soon to be retired professionals.")].

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hebrank has failed to carry his burden to show that his proposed plan of distribution is both fair and reasonable with respect to its treatment of CP3 and Dr. Bricker, and as a result, his Motion must be denied. Dated: August 26, 2013 MUNDELL, ODLUM & HAWS, LLP

<sup>19</sup> Dated: A

MUNDELL, ODLUM & HAWS, LLP MARSHALL BRUBACHER

By: /s/ Marshall Brubacher Marshall Brubacher Attorneys for Objecting Limited Partner Neal Bricker, M.D.

## **DECLARATION OF MARSHALL BRUBACHER**

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 I am an attorney, licensed to practice before the above-entitled Court, and an attorney with Mundell, Odlum & Haws, LLP, counsel for Neal Bricker, M.D. I have personal knowledge of the facts below and if called as a witness I could and would testify competently thereto.

2. I did not receive any notice from counsel for the Receiver, Thomas Hebrank, before the filing of the instant motion for an order approving Mr. Hebrank's planned distribution of Copeland Properties 18, L.P.'s ("CP18") assets to its investors and approving the termination and cancellation of CP18 as an entity. Mr. Hebrank's attorneys did not telephone me, email me, send me a letter, or make any effort to discuss the substance of the Motion or any potential resolution of it prior to filing the Motion.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct and that this Declaration was executed on August 26, 2013.

/s/ Marshall Brubacher

Marshall Brubacher